Prof. Michael Detlefsen - Notre Dame University, Department of Philosophy
October 18, Wednesday at 3 pm Rector's Conference Hall (Rektorluk Binasi) Bogazici University
BOĞAZİÇİ UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
THINGS & THOUGHTS SYMPOSIUM October 20-21, 2006 Kriton Curi Meeting Hall
Program:
October 20, Friday
1st Session:
13:00-13:30 İrem Kurtsal Steen (Syracuse University)
"Non-Arbitrariness of Enduring Objects"
13:40-14:10 Sun Demirli (Boğaziçi University) "Two Questions Concerning the Metaphysics of Individuation"
14:20-14:50 Bill Wringe (Bilkent University) "Making the Lightness of Being Bearable: Arithmetical Platonism, Fictional Realism and Cognitive Command"
15:00-16:00 Coffee Break
2nd Session:
16:00-18:00 Michael Detlefsen (Notre Dame University)
"The Ideals of Proof"
October 21, Saturday
1st Session:
13:00-13:30 Mark Steen (Bilkent University)
"Critiquing Noneism and Monism (or, How to Get Something for Nothing or Everything for the Price of One)"
13:40-14:10 Erdinç Sayan (Middle East Technical University)
"Do We Owe Gratitude to the Divine?"
14:20-14:50 John Bolender (Middle East Technical University)
"Recursion and Human Uniqueness"
Coffee Break
2nd Session
16:00-16:30 Özgür Aktok (Boğaziçi University) "Metaphysics, Science, and Society: The Social Construction of Scientific Theories by Metaphysical Paradigms"
16:40-17:10 Joshua Cowley (Bilkent University) "Inferential Roles and the Relationship between Narrow and Wide Content"
17:20-17:50 İlhan İnan (Boğaziçi University) "Are "Attributive" Uses of Definite Descriptions Really Attributive?"
ABSTRACTS
Mark Steen (Bilkent University)
"Critiquing Noneism and Monism (or, How to Get Something for Nothing or Everything for the Price of One)"
ABSTRACT. Concerns of ontological parsimony have driven some philosophers to defend the view that there are absolutely no things at all (or, at most onethe World). I examine these interesting and surprisingly well-motivated views and diagnose their errors. Both Spinoza's 'field metaphysic' (attributed to him by Bennett), and Cortens and Hawthorne's feature-placing based 'ontological nihilism' surreptitiously re-introduce 'things' or 'substances' into their systems. Alan Sidelle's stuff-ontological object nihilism either has to re-admit objects back into his system, or, perhaps incoherently, and certainly counterintuitively, hold that we create objects ex nihilo by a process of conceptualization.
İrem Kurtsal Steen (Syracuse University)
"Non-Arbitrariness of Enduring Objects"
ABSTRACT. According to Theodore Sider, if persisting objects have no temporal parts, then, either it is sometimes vague when something begins to exist, or ends to exist, or the temporal boundaries of some persisting things are metaphysically arbitrary. Both options are implausible, so, objects must have temporal parts. Although Sider argues against 'ontic vagueness' quite effectively, he does not have a clear case against metaphysical arbitrariness. In my paper I first strengthen his case against arbitrariness. But then, I argue that the temporal boundaries of enduring objects are both precise and non-arbitrary.
Joshua Cowley (Bilkent University)
"Inferential Roles and the Relationship between Narrow and Wide Content"
ABSTRACT. Many supporters of Inferential-role (IR) theories view them as telling only half of the story about conceptual content. More specifically, IR theories are seen as explaining the internal (or narrow) content and not the external (or wide) content of a concept. The wide content is then left to be explained by another theory. What is left out of this story however, is the relationship between the inferential role of a concept and its wide content. In this paper I explore this relationship and suggest some constraints that can be places on a theory of wide content if an IR theory is used to explain narrow content.
Bill Wringe (Bilkent University)
"Making the Lightness of Being Bearable: Arithmetical Platonism, Fictional Realism and Cognitive Command"
ABSTRACT. In this paper I defend a minimalist version of arithmetical Platonism, of a sort recently defended by Hale and Wright from the charge that it gives rise to an unduly capacious ontology - more specifically that the principles on which the Platonist relies to argue that numbers exist can also be used to support the claim that fictional characters such as Hamlet and Sherlock Holmes exist. I argue that there is no principled reason for denying that fictional characters are a legitimate class of abstract object. I then show that the intuition that the objection draws on - that there is some important respect in which numbers are more ontologically respectable than fictional characters - can be respected by the minimal Platonist. This is because we can make a strong case for saying that discourse about arithmetic possesses, while discourse about fiction, lacks an important property labelled (by Wright 1992) as Cognitive Command.
İlhan İnan (Boğaziçi University)
"Are "Attributive" Uses of Definite Descriptions Really Attributive?"
ABSTRACT. In this essay I argue that given Donnellan's formulation of the attributive uses of definite descriptions, as well as Kripke's (1979) and Salmon's (2004) generalized accounts, most uses of definite descriptions that are taken to be attributive turn out not to be so. In building up to my main thesis, I first consider certain problematic cases of uses of definite descriptions that do not neatly fit into any category. I then argue that, in general, a complete definite description we use is complex, in which there is an embedded singular term that is used referentially. From this I conclude that an attributive use of a definite description is a much less rare linguistic phenomenon than what Donnellan, Kripke, and Salmon have presupposed; so much so that the standard examples given by Donnellan of the attributive use of definite descriptions do not qualify as attributive. Finally I point out some important semantic and pragmatic implications of my conclusion.
Özgür Aktok (Boğaziçi University)
"Metaphysics, Science, and Society: The Social Construction of Scientific Theories by Metaphysical Paradigms"
ABSTRACT. The question how sociality is related to the content of scientific theories brings up a tension between the conception of science as an epistemically autonomous enterprise and the conception of science as one of the cultural products of society, interacting with other social phenomena. Roughly, there have been two approaches developed to resolve this tension. On the one hand, there is the classical sociology of science. On the other hand, we have the social constructivist approach, which is developed out of a critique of the former. In this presentation, I point to the problems presented by both of these two approaches, and offer an alternative account, which is based upon a Kantian, critical reinterpretation of the concept of construction. This alternative account introduces the concept of "metaphysical paradigm" as a key concept, and defends a softer version of social constructivism, which overcomes these problems. The main thesis of my account can be summarized as the following: Scientific theories are constructed by social phenomena not directly, but only through a mediation of metaphysical paradigms, which are embodied in social reality.
Sun Demirli (Boğaziçi University)
"Two Issues Concerning the Metaphysics of Individuation"
ABSTRACT. There are two separate questions that philosophers discuss in the vicinity of the metaphysics of individuation: (i) the recipe question: What are the constituents of an individual substance? And (ii) the diversity question: What is the ontological ground for the numerical diversity between individual substances? I group various ontological theories under three labels: type A ontologies, type B1 ontologies and type B2 ontologies. According to type A ontologies, there is a monolithic answer for both the recipe and diversity questions; a list of the constituents of an individual substance, which serves as a recipe for this individual, will also account for its numerical diversity from every other substance. According to type B1 and B2 ontologies, however, there is no monolithic answer for these two questions; that is: the recipe for an individual cannot ground its diversity. As for type B1 ontologies, the diversity between two individuals can only be explained by resorting to these individuals' relations with other individuals. As for type B2 ontologies, on the other hand, the diversity between two individuals can be explained in terms of their spatial distance relation to each other. My goal in this paper is to argue that only type B2 ontologies can give a satisfactory answer to the diversity question. To that end, I will first show that various type A and type B1 ontologies fail to account for the diversity of individuals; and secondly, I will sketch a version of the bundle of universals theory, construed as a type B2 ontology, that I can successfully answer the diversity question.
Erdinç Sayan (Middle East Technical University)
"Do We Owe Gratitude to the Divine?"
ABSTRACT. Most religions exhort us to be grateful to God for creating the world as well as for the bounties He has provided for our enjoyment. Assuming the existence of a God to whom we owe creation of the world, including ourselves, should we be grateful to Him for that? I argue that the boundaries of our concept of gratefulness make it problematic to apply it in such contexts as the creation of the world and creation of individual human beings. In order to meaningfully say that we were lucky to be created, and hence should feel grateful to the creator, we must be able to compare it with what it would be like not to have been created, and ascertain that it is better to be created than not created. Since such comparison seems unavailable to us, it doesn't make sense to be grateful to our creator. There is the additional question of whether those "unactualized" humans who are not given a chance by God to exist are wronged. The question may be asked whether we owe gratitude to God for the bounties he bestowed on us, even if not for our creation. My answer to this question is also negative.
John Bolender (Middle East Technical University)
"Recursion and Human Uniqueness"
ABSTRACT. Recursion appears to be limited in the biological world to human cognition, the best studied example being syntax in language. Occasional claims to the contrary, such as alleged recursion in starling song cognition, are not convincing. There is also evidence that an evolutionary boost in procedural memory explains recursion in syntax. Philosophers have also suggested recursive accounts for each of the following: free will (higher order volition), weakness of the will (superordinate preferences), the moral sense (higher-order evaluation of first order desires), knowledge by description (quantified multiclausal structures), and even some forms of consciousness (higher-order-thought conceptions of consciousness, for example). A case can be made for each one of these traits being uniquely human. As a research project for bridging the gap between philosophy and cognitive science, it is suggested that one look for an explanation of all these cognitive traits in terms of uniquely human procedural memory.
Michael Detlefsen (Notre Dame University)
"The Ideals of Proof"